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COMMENTS
CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF CIIILDREN.--OUt of the Roman,' canon 2 and
common lawa come the ever-present problems arising out of the relation of parent
and child. With the arrival of the monogamous family relationship4 arose
the penetrating question of the custody of children. While the institution of
the home remains normal, nature and law combine to center custody and
control within the domestic household and to resist the meddlesome inter-
ference of government or social agency.5 This orderly norm of parental control
is set forth in striking language by the Supreme Court: 6
"The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations."
Sad to say normalcy no longer obtains in the matrimonial and domestic
orders. The spread of divorce7 in late years has amplified and accentuated
the knotty questions of custody of children. One of the unfortunate and sinister
results of the depressions has been the substantial increase in the number of
1. RADiN, HANDBOOK OF RomAN LAW (1927) 107; FORSYTu, CUSTODY OF INFANTS
(1850) 1.
2. Canon 1132, 5 AUGusTniE, A ComirENTARY ox TnE CANON LAW (1923) 348; Canon
1374, 6 id. at 414.
3. See notes 20, 21 and 22, infra.
4. BRissAUD, HISTORY OF FRENcu PRrVAT LAW (2d ed. 1912) § 24.
5. "The court cannot regulate by its processes the internal affairs of the home. Dispute
between parents when it does not involve anything immoral or harmful to the welfave
of the child is beyond the reach of the law. "The vast majority of matters concerning
the upbringing of children must be left to the conscience, patience, and self-restraint of
father and mother. No end of difficulties would arise should judges try to tell parents
how to bring up their children. Only when moral, mental, and physical conditions are so
bad as seriously to affect the health or morals of children should the courts be called
upon to act." People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N. Y. 285, 287, 2 N. E. (2d) 660, 661
(1936).
"There is a tendency in these days on the part of the civil power to deprive the family
of its inherent and inalienable rights over their children, which tendency is as dangerous
as the attempts of the state to interfere with the inalienable rights of personal freedom
of its citizens. It is old time slavery in another form." 1 VOYWOD, A PRATIcAL COM-
MENTARY ON Tim CODHi OF CANON LAW (1925) 703.
6. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925).
7. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 249.
In 1889 the number of divorces per one thousand marriages was 60 and this number
increased to 160 divorces per one thousand marriages in 1928. REUTER, Tha FAmmY
(1931) 211.
8. Of the 18,067,000 persons on the relief in the United States in 1935, 2,876,800 or
15.9% were 16 to 24 years of age. MONT.LY LABOR REV., July, 1936, at 47.
Approximately 20% of the 273,820 persons who were receiving assistance as transients
in May 1935 were youths from 16 to 24 years of age. Id. at 45.
The Federal government recognized the problem presented by this transient population
and as a consequence in 1933 formed the FERA and installed a transient division of
relief to provide for the wanderers. This project has been gradually abandoned. Emphasis
has turned toward the CCC. More than 145,000 have graduated to permanent jobs from
a shifting roll call of 1,500,000 names. LITRARY DIGEST, July 25, 1936, at 28.
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neglected and destitute offspring. Typical of the human interest interlocked
in this most intimate of relations is the news value discerned by the press in
the recent Vanderbilt decision,9 the Eaton case1 0 and the Astor controversy.21
The problem combines legal rules, sentiment, delicacy, expediency and sympa-
thetic appreciation of the facts. Frequently involved are the cross interests
of State,'2 Church,' 3 parents, child, relatives-and even strangers.14 The facets
of this multi-angled controversy test the ingenuity and acumen of the judicial
order. Stressing, then, the abnormal situations which give rise to the necessity
of adjudication as to custody and control of children, what are the fundamental
principles discernible out of the decisions and precedents of the courts?
Those Entitled to Custody
The early Roman law was distinguished for the harshness with which it
upheld parental authorityj 5 The father was given unlimited power10 over
his children even to the extent of putting them to death' 7 or selling them in
open market.'8 While the mother was entitled only to due respect from the
children and any wanton disregard of her position was punished,'0 her right
to custody was not legally recognized. At early English common law the father,
as of right, was entitled to the custody of his minor children -0 and at times
his right was considered absolute,- even when its exercise was detrimental
9. This case caused great interest because of the social prominence of the parties
involved. Mrs. Vanderbilt was ordered by the court to yield custody of her eleven year
old daughter to the child's aunt. Matter of Vanderbilt, 245 App. Div. 211, 281 N. Y.
Supp. 171 (1st Dep't 1935), aff'd, 270 N. Y. 549 (1936), cert. denied, 297 U. S. 724 (1936).
10. See notes 65 and 66, infra.
11. The tragedy of the Astor case is disclosed in the comment of the court that the
4-year-old daughter of the marriage would "not be awarded as the revenge prize in the
family row.' N. Y. Sun, Aug. 7, 1936, p. 13.
12. When a court determines a question of custody it not only furnises the machineky
for the settlement of a dispute between the parties but also takes a substantial interest in
the result as representative of the state which stands in the relation of paoens palriae to
infants within its borders. Payton v. Payton, 29 N. M. 618, 620, 225 Pac. 576, 577 (1924).
13. See note 56, infra.
14. See notes 111 and 113, infra.
15. The father, pater familias, had almost absolute power over his family. This power
was called manus when applied to his wife, potestas when applied to his children and
dominium when applied to his slaves. RAnia, HAxDBOOK or Roa.ui LAwe (1927) 107.
See FoRs=, CusToDY or I1TrA=M S (1850) 1.
16. "Jus autem potestatis, quod in liberos habernus, proprium est civium Romanorum.
Nulli enim ali sunt homines qui tatem in iberos habeant potestatem, qualcir nos habenuil'
1 INrsTrurEs or JusTIniAw fit. IX, § 2. For translation see, 2 Scotr, TuE Czvx LAw 318.
17. HuNm, INTRODUCrIoN To RomrAx LAw (9th ed. 1934) 30.
18. RoAN ArQun7Es or Diorrsrus HALzcAsusAssazsis, Translation by Spelman
(i758) bk. 1, c. 26, 27.
19. 8 CoDx or JusNA-N tit. 47, § 4. See 14 ScoTr C=vI L , 318.
20. 1 BL. Coanr. *452; 2 Kzrr's Comm. *204; 3 HownswoRru, tsrony or M.us
LAw (3d ed. 1927) 511.
21. Matter of Andrews, L. R. 8 Q. B. 153 (1873); Rex v. Greenhill, 4 A. & E. 624,
111 Eng. Reprints 922 (K. B. 1836); Ex parte Hopkins, 3 P. Wins. 152, 24 Eng. Reprints
1009 (Ch. 1732).
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to the infant's welfare 2 2 However, this stringent rule was relaxed by statute"3
and a humane judicial tendency.24
In the United States at common law the father, because of his natural and
legal obligations to support, protect and educate,25 was recognized as the
natural guardian of the person of his minor child. 20  But this right was not
absolute for it centered in the father primarily for the benefit of the infant,
the law presuming that it would be for the child's best interest to be under
the nurture and care of the father.27 This is illustrated by the fact that if
the father showed himself disqualified 28 for the trust imposed in him by the
law and his relationship, the child was given into such custody as was most
beneficial to its welfare.29 The mother's legal interest in her children at com-
mon law was subservient to the father's right, but when he was adjudged an
unfit guardian the children were generally awarded to the mother.3 0 In any
event she succeeded to the right of custody on the father's death. 1 It has
22. The action of a father who took his child from its mother's breast was condoned
upon the ground of the father's superior right to the custody of his minor children. Rex
v. Manneville, 5 East. 221, 102 Eng. Reprints 1054 (K. B. 1804).. This decision was dis-
cussed with approval in Queen v. Clark, 7 E. & B. 186, 194, 119 Eng. Reprints 1217,
1220 (Q. B. 1857).
23. Talfourds Act, 1893, 2 & 3 Vicr. c. 54 (giving court of chancery authority to award
custody of children under the age of seven to the mother); Infants Custody Act, 1873,
36 & 37 Vicr. c. 12 (conferring such authority as to all children under sixteen); 15 & 16
GEO. V c. 45 (1925). This last act gave equal rights to the parents, regardless of sex, to
apply to a court of chancery for the custody of infant children.
24. Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufert, 2 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Reprints 236 (Ch. 1827);
Wellesley v. Wellesley, 2 Bligh (N. s.) 124, 4 Eng. Reprints 1078 (H. L. 1828); Queen
v. Gyngall [1893] 2 Q. B. 232.
25. 2 KELPis Comm. *205. For a criticism of the doctrine that custody and services of
a child are correlatives of the father's duty of support, see, Comment (1928) 42 HAv. L.
REv. 112; 4 VERN=E, Al mcAN FAmmy LAWS (1936) 18.
26. Busbee v. Weeks, 80 Fla. 323, 85 So. 653 (1920); Miner v. Miner, 11 I1. 43
(1849); McDonald v. Short, 190 Ind. 338, 130 N. E. 536 (1921); McBride v. McBride,
64 Ky. 15 (1886); Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. 203 (1834); EB parte Turner, 151
N. C. 474, 66 S. E. 431 (1909); People ex rel. Olmstead v. Olmstead, 27 Barb. 9 (N. Y.
1857).
27. See Wilson v. Mitchell, 45 Colo. 454, 466, 111 Pac. 21, 25 (1910).
28. McGrady v. Brown, 230 Ala. 484, 161 So. 475 (1935); Ladd v. Ladd, 188 Iowa
351, 176 N. W. 211 (1920); Nathan v. Nathan, 102 Neb. 59, 165 N. W. 955 (1917);
Larsen v. Wellner, 97 Ore. 513, 191 Pac. 671 (1920); Owens v. Owens, 96 Va. 191, 31
S. E. 72 (1898). Cf. Duncan v. Duncan, 119 Miss. 271, 80 So. 697 (1919) (the fact that
a father plays poker and drinks whiskey does not render him unfit to have his child's
custody).
29. See note 54 and 94, infra.
30. Schnuck v. Schnuck, 163 Ky. 133, 173 S. W. 347 (1915); Jones v, Jones, 173 N. C.
279, 91 S. E. 960 (1917); Regenvetter v. Regenvetter, 124 Wash. 173, 213 Pac. 917
(1923); in re Knoll Guardianship, 167 Wis. 461, 167 N. W. 744 (1918).
31. Dunham v. Dunham, 97 Conn. 440, 117 Ati. 504 (1922); State ex rd. Sevier v.
Sevier, 141 La. 60, 74 So. 630 (1917); Watts v. Smylie, 116 Miss. 12, 76 So. 684 (1917);
Matter of Thorne, 240 N. Y. 444, 148 N. E. 630 (1925). A surviving father's right to
custody of minor children is paramount to that of all others, including persons named
as testamentary guardians in deceased mother's will. People ex rel Boulware v. Martens,
258 N. Y. 534, 180 N. E. 321 (1931).
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always been the rule that the mother is entitled to the custody of her
illegitimate child, the father having no claim whatsoever as against ber. 2 But,
as in the case of legitimate issue, the right of the mother is not absolute.
Should she be shown unfit, the good of the child is the paramount consideration
in selecting another custodian.P When a marriage, productive of issue, has
been annulled the court will make the proper orders for the support and edu-
cation of the children. 34 If lunacy or fraud is the cause of the annullment
the child will be awarded to the sane35 or innocent party.3 Where both
father and mother because of death or disqualification are removed from con-
sideration the child will be entrusted to the one best able to promote its
interests.37 In such a situation near relatives are usually preferred. 8 Ordinarily
a grandmother has a stronger claim to the custody of her grandchildren than
more remote kin. 9
32. Glansman v. Ledbetter, 190 Ind. 505, 130 N. E. 230 (1921); Pitzenberger v. Schnack,
215 Iowa 466, 245 N. W. 713 (1932); Grillo v. Shernan-Stalter Co., 195 App. Div. 362,
186 N. Y. Supp. 810 (3d Dep't 1921), af'd, 231 N. Y. 621, 132 N. E. 913 (1921). The
consent of a seventeen year old unmarried mother to give her child to a third party at
birth to avoid disgrace was not such an abandonment as to preclude her from claiming
the child. Jensen v. Earley, 63 Utah 604, 228 Pac. 217 (1924).
33. Glaisman v. Ledbetter, 190 Ind. 505, 130 N. E. 230 (1921) ; Ez pari¢ Byron, 83 Vt.
108, 74 Ati. 488 (1909). The mother of an illegitimate child has all the rights of other
parents. Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 802 (1907).
34. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1921) § 1140. "If a marriage be declared a nullity or
annulled, the court... may award the custody of a child of the marriage to either party
as the interests of the child require, and may make provision for his education and
maintenance out of the property of either or both of its parents if the marriage shall
have been declared a nullity, and out of the property of the guilty parent, if the marriage
shall have been annulled.' Similar statutes have been enacted in other states. For a
collection of statutes, see 1 VERN=E, AmncA FA=Y LAws (1931) § 54.
The pendency of an annulment action in which the husband sought custody of a child
was not a bar to his habeas corpus proceeding for the same relief. People ex rd.
McCanliss v. McCanliss, 255 N. Y. 456, 175 N. E. 129 (1931).
35. When marriage is annulled because of lunacy the child of the marriage is the
legitimate child of the sane party only. In re Tombo, 164 App. Div. 392, 149 N. Y. Supp.
688 (1st Dep't 1914).
36. Hardesty v. Hardesty, 193 Cal. 330, 223 Pac. 951 (1924). The custody of children
of an incestuous marriage is a question for the trial court. Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal.
354, 295 Pac. 339 (1931).
37. Burton v. Burton, 184 Ky. 268, 211 S. W. 869 (1919); Pryor v. Pryor, 146 Md.
683, 131 At. 47 (1924). The child's welfare and not the desires of the parents govern.
Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 700, 202 S. W. 723 (1918). Since parents have no propa-ty
rights in their child its custody may be given to a third party even without the consent
of the parents. Ex parte Wallace, 26 N. M. 181, 190 Pac. 1020 (1920).
38. Corn v. Hollon, 191 Ind. 248, 132 N. E. 587 (1921); Risting v. Sparboe, 179 Ioma
1133, 162 N. W. 592 (1917); Ex parte Collins, 160 Mich. 531, 125 N. W. 389 (1910)
(mother's sister-in-law retains custody); Ex parte Means, 176 N. C. 307, 97 S. E. 39 (1918)
(father's mother and sister given custody); Larson v. Welner, 97 Ore. 513, 191 Pac. 671
(1920); Cover v. Widener, 125 Va. 643, 100 S. E. 459 (1919) (grandparents entitled to
custody of thirteen year old girl as against father who deserted wife during child's
infancy and never contributed to child's support).
39. See People x rel. Holliday v. Sherwood, 119 Misc. 538, 540, 197 N. Y. Supp.
612, 614 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
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Today, a majority of states by statutory modification have conferred equal
rights on the father and mother in the rearing, control and custody of infants.40
Other states have simply codified the common law in statutory form.41 Thus
it appears that in the great majority of jurisdictions the natural claim and
interest of a mother in her children has crystallized into a legal prerogative. It
is interesting to note that in those states conferring equal custody on the parents,
the obligation of support4 2 and the right to fix the child's domicil43 remain with
the father. An action solely for the custody of children is not maintainable.44
The only proper way to determine the question, other than by means of
custodial order as incidental to a matrimonial proceeding, is through a petition
in equity, or by a writ of habeas corpus45 in a state court.40
Custody as Incidental to Divorce or Separation Proceedings
While the normal domestic status continues, the law recognizes the right of
the father and the mother to the companionship and the privilege of rearing
their children, 47 but when irreparable friction arises and the courts are asked
40. Generally, such statutes declare that the father and mother are mutually the
natural guardians of the person of their minor children. APiz. REV. CODY ANN.
(Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4118; COLO. Comr. STAT. (1921) § 5542; CoN. GEN. STAT. (1930)
§ 4794; FLA. ComP. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1927) § 5884; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 15
-1805; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 68, § 16; IowA CODE (1931) § 12573; KAN.
CONST. art. XV, § 6; ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 72, § 43; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, Supp.
1929) art. 72 A, § 1; MscH. COmp. LAWS (1929) § 15768; MnrN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§ 8933; Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 1863; Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 375; NED.
Coiw. STAT. (1929) § 38-107; N. H. PuE. LAWS (1926) c. 290, § 4; N. J. Coma'. STAT.
(1911) tit. 97, § 21; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 62-201; N. Y. DOM. REL.
LAW (1923) § 81; N. C. CODE ANNe. (Michie, 1931) § 2241; Omio GEN. CODE (Page, 1931)
§ 8032; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 33-304; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 48, § 91;
S. C. CoDE (Michie, 1932) § 8638; S. D. Coiw. LAWS (1929) § 200; TENN. CODI:
(Williams, 1932) § 8463; Wis. STAT. (1933) § 319.03. For a discussion of this legis-
lation, see, 4 VERN=, AmEICAN FAMmY LAWS (1936) § 232.
41. The purport of these statutes is that the father is the natural guardian of hIs
minor children; and on his death the mother succeeds to this right.' ARx. Dxo. STAT.
(Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 4991; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 3021; IND. STAT. ANN.
(Bums, 1933) § 3388; LA. Civ. CODE ANN. (Dart, 1932) art. 216; N. D. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. (1913) § 8878; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Harlow, 1931) § 1685.
See, 4 VERNm, AMEPICAw FAmLY LAWS (1936) § 232.
42. Russell v. Russell, 170 Miss. 364, 154 So. 881 (1934); Laumeler v. Laumeler, 237
N. Y. 357, 143 N. E. 219 (1924); Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 83 Utah 166, 27 P.
(2d) 434 (1933) (a minor cannot waive his father's obligation of support).
43. Trammell v. Kansas Compensation Board, 142 Kan. 329, 46 P. (2d) 867 (1935);
Ferguson's Adm'r v. Ferguson's Adm'r, 255 Ky. 230, 73 S. W. (2d) 31 (1934); Matter of
Thorne, 240 N. Y. 444, 148 N. E. 630 (1925).
44. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429, 148 N. E. 624 (1925).
45. 10 CARmODY, PLEADiNG AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1934) 62.
46. The states alone have jurisdiction of the whole subject of the domestic relation
of husband and wife and of parent and child. Ex part€ Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593, 594
(1890). The federal courts have always been denied jurisdiction over questions of
divorce and alimony. Barbe)r v. Barber, 62 U. S. 582 (1858). The custody of a child
is a question local in its nature and not federal. Matters v. Ryan, 249 U. S. 375 (1919).
47. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N. Y. 285, 2 N. E. (2d) 660 (1936).
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to terminate the marriage relationship it is no longer possible for the child
to have the advantage of their joint comfort and support. When all the parties
are before it the court exercising jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding has the
power to determine the custody of minor children. This power is in most
jurisdictions regulated by statute, 48 but the making of custody decrees in
divorce suits is such an accepted fact that the basis of the decree is seldom
expressed, the court contenting itself with the statementt' that the decree is
authorized as an incident to the divorce proceeding.50
As a general rule the children will be awarded to the innocent spouse."
However it does not necessarily follow that the victorious party in a divorce
suit will be awarded the custody of a minor child. Guilt or innocence of
either party is not a conclusive factor. Thus a mother guilty of bigamy and
adultery received the custody of a young girl, even in the absence of mis-
conduct on the part of the father.52  The court in the exercise of its broad
discretion 5 will determine what is to the "best interests'7saL of the child.5 4
48. For a collection of the legislation on this subject see 1 VmuIER, A .umxc.- FAam,
LAws (1931) § 54. See also, Note (1913) 41 L. R. A. (. s.) 597.
49. Ross v. Ross, 89 Colo. 536, 5 P. (2d) 246 (1931); Mfnick v. Minick, Ill Fla.
620, 149 So. 483 (1933); Stephens v. Stephens, 53 Idaho 427, 24 P. (2d) 52 (1933).
50. The decisions are not harmonious as to whether custody of children will be
awarded by the court when a divorce or separation is 'efused. The principle that when
equity acquires jurisdiction for one purpose, it will grant complete relief, is favored by
some states. Cairnes v. Cairnes, 211 Ala. 342, 100 So. 317 (1924); Workman v. Wo'rk-
man, 191 Ky. 124, 229 S. W. 379 (1921); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 136 Blinn. 190, 161 N. W.
525 (1917); Barker v. Barker, 105 Okla. 240, 232 Pac. 371 (1924) (no likelihood of p3rties
becoming reconciled so court made necessary order for children's benefit); Adams v.
Adams, 178 Wis. 522, 190 N. W 359 (1922). Othe& jurisdictions hold that a divorce
court has no power to make custodial orders when the divorce or separation is not granted.
Thomas v. Thomas, 250 Ill. 354, 95 N. E. 345 (1911); Oliver v. Oliver, 216 Iowa 57, 248
N. W. 233 (1933); Walker v. Walker, 140 Miss. 340, 105 So. 753 (1925); Redding v.
Redding, 85 Atl. 712 (N. J. Ch. 1912); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429, 148 N. E. 624
(1925); Robinette v. Robinette, 153 Va. 342, 149 S. E. 493 (1929).
51. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 141 Iowa 192, 119 N. W. 599 (1909); Anderson v. Anderson,
152 Ky. 773, 154 S. W. 1 (1913); Van Buren v. Van Buten, 227 Mich. 131, 193 N. W.
584 (1924); Folkenberg v. Folkenberg, 58 Ore. 267, 114 Pac. 99 (1911); Owens v. Owens,
96 Va. 191, 31 S. E. 72 (1898); Regenvetter v. Regenvetter, 124 Wash. 173, 213 Pac. 917
(1923).
52. Haskell v. Haskell, 152 Mlass. 16, 24 N. E. 859 (1890).
This seemingly shocking disposition of the child is well supported by authority. Rieden
v. Rieden, 206 Mich. 550, 173 N. W. 362 (1919); Grant v. Grant, 110 AUt. 70 (R. L 1920)
(mother granted divorce for husband's extreme cruelty but he was awarded custody of
child); Twohig v. Twohig, 176 Wis. 275, 186 N. W. 592 (1922).
53. A court trying the question of a child's custody is entrusted with a wide discretion.
Joslyn v. Ohlmache, 229 Mich. 181, 200 N. W. 968 (1924); Martin v. Mlartin, 184 S. E.
220 (Va. 1936). For a general discussion of judicial discretion in equity suits, sce
Hennessey v. Carmony, 50 N. J. Eq. 616, 625, 25 AtL 374, 379 (1892).
53a. No more elusive standard exists than the "best-interests" test. What is the
relative value of money, education, religion, sympathy, environment, etc., in applying the
"best-interests" norm? See WE=, Tan LEGAL Erc or A,--Nurmri Pnoa.sxs n
MD= MA-EAGFs (1932) 48. See notes 55 to 60, infra.
54. Basden v. Basden, 209 Ala. 632, 96 So. 881 (1923); Burton v. Burton, 184 Ky.
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Every element of the child's mental and physical surroundings is a factor to
be considered. Its age,55 religion,5 6 sex,5 7 state of health,58 the election of the
'child59 and its peace of mind60 are interlocking factors in the settlement of a
custodial decree. So also the character, 61 pecuniary position, 2 political beliefs08
and education64 of those contending for its custody receive due weight in the
decision.
268, 211 S. W. 869 (1919); Pangle v. Pangle, 134 Md. 166, 106 AtI. 337 (1919); Chadwick
v. Chadwick, 275 Mich. 226, 266 N. W. 331 (1936); Bierck v. Bierck, 123 Ati. 537 (N. J.
Ch. 1923); Hoffmann v. Hoffmann, 224 App. Div. 28, 229 N. Y. Supp. 489 (Ist Dep't
1928); Morris v. Morris, 81 Okla. 222, 198 Pac. 70 (1921); Martin v. Martin, 184 S. E.
220 (Va. 1936); Pressey v. Pressey, 184 Wash. 191, 50 P. (2d) 891 (1935).
55. The mother unless unfit, is awarded children of a tender age. McFadden v.
McFadden 22 Ariz. 246, 196 Pac. 452 (1921); Porter v. Porter, 168 Md. 296, 177 Atl.
464 (1935) (custody of seven year old daughter of separated parents awarded to mother) ;
Boxa v. Boxa, 92 Neb. 78, 137 N. W. 986 (1912) (mother given children one and three
years old); Matter of Vardinakis, 160 Misc. 13, 289 N. Y. Supp. 355 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1936);
Sachs v. Sachs, 145 Ore. 23, 25 P. (2d) 159 (1933); Ostrander v. Ostrander, 176 Wash.
669, 30 P. (2d) 658 (1934) (child's welfare and not warring parents' natural rights is guide
for awarding child of tender years) ; Burt v. Burt, 48 Wyo. 19, 41 P. (2d) 524 (1935).
56. In the Matter of Vardinakis, 160 Misc. 13, 289 N. Y. Supp. 355 (Dona. Rol. Ct.
1936).
"Whenever a child is remanded or committed by the court to any duly authorized
association, agency, society or institution, other than an institution supported and controlled
by the state or a subdivision thereof, such committment must be made, when practicable,
to a duly authorized association, agency, society or institution under the control of the
persons of the same religious faith or persuasion as that of the child." N. Y. DoM. REL.
CT. Acr. (1933) § 88 (1).
See WmTE, THE LEGAL EFmcr oF A=T-NuPTiAL PROASES IN MIXED MARRIAOES (1932)
47 et seq.; Friedman, Parental Right to Control the Religious Education of a Child (1916)
29 HARv. L. REv. 485.
57. Courts are disposed to award custody of young girls to mothers even in situations
where the child would have been placed elsewhere if it had been older. Ross v. Ross, 89
Colo. 536, 541, 5 P. (2d) 246, 249 (1931). Matter of Vardinakis, 160 Misc. 13, 289
N. Y. Supp. 355 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1936) (oldest girl awarded to the mother and oldest
boy to the parental uncle).
58. McFadden v. McFadden, 22 Ariz. 246, 196 Pac. 452 (1921); Umlauf v. Urnlauf,
128 Ill. 378, 21 N. E. 600 (1889); Barlow v. Barlow, 28 Ky. 664, 90 S. W. 216 (1906);
Campbell v. Campbell, 96 N. J. EQ. 398, 130 Atl. 361 (1924) (decree of alternating
custody reversed); In re Welch, 74 N. Y. 299 (1878); see Parrish v. Parrish, 116 Va.
476, 481, 82 S. E. 119, 121 (1914) (danger to child of a change in climate, controlling).
59. See notes 72 and 104, infra.
60. See Oliver v. Oliver, 151 Mass. 349, 351, 24 N. E. 51, 51 (1890).
61. Hartkemeir v. Hartkemeir, 248 Ky. 803, 59 S. W. (2d) 1014 (1933); Arx v.
Arix, 212 Mich. 438, 180 N. W. 463 (1920) (mother living with paramour); Wandersee v.
Wandersee, 132 Minn. 321, 156 N. W. 348 (1916); Jones v. Jones, 173 N. C. 279, 91
S. E. 960 (1917); Page v. Page, 124 App. Div. 421, 108 N. Y. Supp. 864 (1st Dep't
1908), aft'd, 195 N. Y. 540, 88 N. E. 1127 (1909) (evidence insufficient to show mother
wai not entitled to children's custody because of habitual use of narcotics and liquors).
62. Moore v. Moore, 192 Iowa 394, 184 N. W. 732 (1921); People ex rel. Glendening,
v. Glendening 288 N. Y. Supp. 840 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
63. See note 65, infra.
64. A mother's lack of education tended to defeat her claims to her son's custody.
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A current case-Eaton v. Eaton65-agitating the commentatorscO awarded
custody of minor children to the father as an incident to a divorce proceeding.
The furor arose because the Advisory Master stated that the atheistic and
communistic leanings of the mother rendered her unfit to receive custody of
the child. Suffice it to say that the husband was granted a divorce on the
ground of the wife's extreme cruelty. Incident thereto it was not at all
improper for the court to award custody of the children to the innocent party.
While the principle of non-interference by the State with normal domestic
affairs is deeply rooted in American law,67 it must be noted that in the Eaton
case normalcy no longer obtained. Surely as one of many factors, the Master
might well consider the objectives of communism in relation to youth.s This
attempt to keep children's minds patriotically untarnished is no modern devel-
opment. 69 The religious aspect of the case offers a prolific field for individual
sentiment and antagonistic debate, especially in a country whose constitution
provides for freedom of worship.7°
"In my opinion this difference in education is sufficient alone to justify leaving the boy
in the father's custody during his school days." People ex rd. Glendenins v. Glendening,
288 N. Y. Supp. 840, 848 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
65. Eaton v. Eaton, N. J. Ct. of Chancery, Jan. 27, 1936, Docket No. 111, p. 54.
The original decree allowed to the mother only the right of visitation. N. Y. Times, Jan.
30, 1936, p. 1, col 4. A modified ruling permitted Ars. Eaton to take the children to her
own home during specified hours every two weeks. N. Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 26,
1936, p. 16.
66. The interest occasioned by this decision is 'reflected in its wide and diversified
publication. See (1936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 678; (1936) 49 HAuv. L. Rsv. 831; Editorial,
N. Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1936; The New Yorker, Aug. 22 1936, p. 9. The American Civil
Liberties Union has published a book entitled, "Tim Sml=ca CAr or Man. F =zo:;.'
67. See notes S and 6, supr.
See Tosti, The Regulation of Education in the United States (Unpublished thesis in
the Fordham Law School Library, 1933).
68. "The Soviet School is a vehicle for the principles of communim, i.., the principles
underlying the teachings of Marx and Lenin. It is its function to convey the influence
of the proletariat to the other layers of the working masses?' PxuanmwvEr, Sc:mcn AlD
EDUCATION n =a U. S. S. R. (1935) 27.
"In his brilliant speech, incomparable in its value for Communistic education, delivered
at the Third Komsomol Congress in 1920, Lenin said: 'The problem of the youth move-
ment is to conduct its activities in such a way that in the progress of learning, organizing,
cooperating, and striving, youth will develop itself and all others who recognize its
leadership to the end that it may make Communists?" Tow, CWAczM EuCAIxoY nzT
Sov= RussiA (1934) 38.
69. Aristotle in his '"orancs" wrote, ". . . it is an axiom that the best laws though
sanctioned by every citizen of the State will be of no avail unless the young are trained
by habit and education in the spirit of the Constitution."
The poet Shelley was denied custody of his children because of Yevolutionary Ideas
expressed in his "Queen Mab". The court did not deem him a fit parent and awarded
custody of his children to the grandparents. Shelley v. Westbrooke, Jac. 266, 37 Eng.
Reprints 850 (Ch. 1817). See Correspondence, N. Y. L. J. Feb. 24, 1936, p. 948.
70. For a discussion, of this subject see, Wm'rE, op. cit. supra note 56, at 47; Friedman,
The Parental Right to Control the Religious Education of a Child (1916) 29 Htnv. L.
Ray. 485.
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If the child has reached the age of reason 71 its preference as to either parent
will sometimes be decisive.72  The weight accorded to such a choice varies
directly in proportion to the infant's age and mental development.7" Thus an
unequivocally expressed desire of a daughter within a few months of her
majority will greatly influence a court.74 If the child is not capable of express-
ing a sound discretion the court will appoint the custodian best fitted to care
for the child.75
It has been suggested that custodial decrees partake of a penal nature against
the party refused custody.76 This punitive interpretation is perhaps present
in specific instances.77 But the marital culprit fails to obtain custody not
because of his offense but because of the court's endeavor to transfer control
to the one best fitted to care for and protect the child's interests.78 A decree
of custody is not permanent but temporary and always subject to modification
by the court of rendition if a sufficient change of circumstances is shown. 70
Such a decree only establishes the rights of the two opposing parties during their
lifetime so that the right of the survivor, if a suitable person, again revives and
is superior to claims of third parties.80 Upon the death of the spouse to whom
71. It is no easy task to determine at what age a child is capable of exercising a sound
discretion. But it is hardly proper to permit a child of tender years to determine the
person to whom its custody should be entrusted.
72. Frates v. Frates, 135 Wash. 567, 238 Pac. 573 (1925).
73. Garlin v. Garlin, 154 Okla. 230, 7 P. (2d) 463 (1932).
74. (1928) 92 Jus=cn oF PEAcE 208.
75. HocsurEum, CusToDY OF INFANTS (3d ed. 1899) § 46.
76. See N. Y. L. J. Feb. 5, 1936, at 650. This editorial which discusses a case of
custody is captioned "Penalizing Opinions".
77. Moore v. Moore, 192 Iowa 394, 184 N. W. 732 (1921) (father guilty of despicable
conduct toward mother was refused custody without any discussion of the child's wel-
fare); Folkenberg v. Folkenberg, 58 Ore. 267, 114 Pac. 99 (1911) (father's cruel treat-
ment of mother seems to be reason the mother was awarded custody).
78. The child's welfare is the only explanation of an adulterous mother receiving the
child's custody; see note 52, supra. Similarly the father's obligation to support a child
who is in the custody of a divorced mother is not penal but rather is imposed for the
good of the child, and to prevent it from becoming a public charge. See Beale, The
Progress of the Law (1919) 33 HARv. L. Rzv. 1, 14; see Comment (1930) 15 CoRN. L. Q.
624, 627.
79. Skidmore v. Skidmore, 261 Ky. 327, 87 S. W. (2d) 631 (1935); Higginbotham v.
Lofton, 193 La. 489, 164 So. 255 (1935); Bestel v. Bestel, 53 P. (2d) 525 (Ore. 1936);
Standish v. Standish, 177 Wash. 478, 32 P. (2d) 110 (1934).
"... The court by order upon the application of either party to the action, or any
other person or party having the care, custody and control of said child or children pursuant
to said final judgment or order, .. .may annul, vary or modify such directions .. . as
justice requires for the custody, care, education and maintenance of any such child ... .
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1934) § 1170.
80. People ex rel. Westfall v. Gorham, 70 Colo. 544, 203 Pac. 661 (1922) ; Stafford v.
Stafford, 299 Ill. 438, 132 N. E. 452 (1921); In re Smith's Guardianship, 158 N. W. 578
(Iowa 1916); In re Crews, 106 Kan. 438, 186 Pac. 498 (1920); Stone v. Duffy, 219 Mass.
178, 106 N. E. 595 (1904); Matter of Thorne, 240 N. Y. 444, 148 N. E. 630 (1925);
Ex parte Bryant, 106 Ore. 359, 210 Pac. 454 (1922); Yates v. Yates, 165 Wis. 250, 161
N. W. 743 (1917).
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custody has been awarded, his or her right of custody does not descend nor
can it be transmitted by testamentary document.8l
Ordinarily a decree of custody provides for access to the child by the
absentee-parent at specific intervals.82  This right of visitation is so highly
regarded by the court that if the parent having custody intentionally makes it
difficult for the other parent to visit the child, it is considered cause for
modifying the custodial decree.83 Except where there is extreme ground for
refusal all will agree that a parent should be given an opportunity to see his
or her child, even when that parent's conduct occasioned the divorce or
separation.
But where the custody of the child has been alternately awarded to each
parent for an equal period of time, it would seem that the sensibilities of the
father and mother received more recognition than the good of the child.P
Although he may be well provided with material things such a child lacks
a static and normal family life which is so essential to an infant's moral and
intellectual development 80 There is danger that young children might attach
their affections to those who administer to their needs and comforts and cater
to their whims.87  Hence in the case of a decree of intermittent custody it
is more than likely that the child will be emotionally swayed in opposing
directions as it vacillates between parents 88 An absolute award of custody
81. People ex rel. Boulware v. Martens, 258 N. Y. 534, 180 N. E. 321 (1931) (sur-
viving father's right is superior to that of testamentary guardian named in mother's will).
82. Chadwick v. Chadwick, 275 Mich. 226, 266 N. W. 331 (1936) (decree giving right
to visit child at reasonable time suitable to both parties was erroneous. Although right
of visitation is not absolute, time and place for visit should be specified). Kennard v.
Kennard, 87 N. H. 320, 179 At. 414 (1935) (a father's pro-German sympathies and
disloyalty to the American flag did not warrant an order depriving him of acceEs to his
minor son).
83. Oliver v. Oliver, 151 Mass. 349, 24 N. E. 51 (1890); Phipps v. Phipps, 168 Mo.
App. 697, 154 S. IV. 825 (1913). Only the father or mother is entitled to this right
of visitation. Thus a court has no power to grant this right to maternal grandmother
where the father is the proper guardian. People ex rel. Schachter v. Kahn, 241 App.
Div. 686, 269 N. Y. Supp. 173 (2d Dep't 1934).
84. See note 65, supra.
85. A child awarded for alternate periods of time to each parent is a "wanderer
from home to home.' McDermott v. McDermott, 192 Minn. 32, 36, 255 N. W. 247, 248
(1934). A child is not a "plaything for the entertainment of its parents.' Caldwell v.
Caldwell, 141 Iowa 192, 119 N. W. 599 (1909). This case reversed a decree which gave
custody to the father and mother every six months. A child's interest will be better
served by placing him permanently with one parent rather than by alternation of his
custody. Bradstreet v. Bradstreet, 34 Ariz. 340, 346, 271 Pac. 717, 719 (1928).
86. The lack of family leadership by one person is detrimental to the child's social
adaptability. Editorial, Divided Custody of Children (1935) 38 LAw Norms 42. He wiU
either "play" one parent against the other, or become a plastic mold impressed with the
several characteristics of those privileged to have its custody. See N. Y. Herald Tribune,
Mar. 18, 1934, Magazine Section, Week End Children, p. 18.
87. THois, NoRam YouTH um ITs EvRY DAY PROBLE as (1932) 340.
88. The child's conflicting loyalties, varying with the calendar, deprive him of a sense
of security which is an essential to normal development. Wmmr HousE Co,zm~cs o:.
Cmr H znm= AxD PRoThCTio. SEcriox IV (1930).
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and control to the spouse best fitted for the trust, with a provision that the
other parent may visit the child at regular periods, would obviate this potential
difficulty and would be a true consideration of the infant's best interests.89
Voluntary Submission of the Question to the Court
When the custody of children is not awarded as an incident to a suit for
divorce or separation the subject is regulated by either a writ of habeas corpus
or by petition to the chancellor or to the court which has succeeded to the
chancellor's prerogative.90 Equity in exercising its jurisdiction on petition does
not proceed upon the theory that one party has a cause of action against the
other, nor seek to determine respective rights as to the child, but acts rather in
the position of parens patriae9 ' and its aim is, as ever, to decide what is best
for the interests of the child. Although the fundamental purpose of a writ of
habeas corpus is to set free those who are illegally deprived of their liberty,92
when the writ is directed to a child, the question of personal liberty is not
paramount. The court then is not determining strict legal rights 8 but is called
upon to consider claims of an equitable nature, having in view primarily the
welfare of the child.94 In a divorce suit the child's custody is generally awarded
to either of its natural guardians,9 5 the father or mother. But when, by a
89. See Bradstreet v. Bradstreet, 34 Ariz. 340, 346, 271 Pac. 717, 719 (1928); Caldwell
v. Caldwell, 141 Iowa 192, 195, 119 N. W. 599, 600 (1909); McDermott v. McDermott,
192 Minn. 32, 36, 255 N. W. 247, 248 (1934); Campbell v. Campbell, 96 N. J. Eq. 398,
398, 130 Atl. 361, 361 (1924); Editorial, Divided Custody of Children (1935) 38 LAW
NoTms 42.
90. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429, 148 N. E. 624 (1925); Queen v. Gyngall, [1893)
2 Q. B. 232.
91. Ex parte Flynn, 87 N. J. Eq. 413, 100 At. 861 (1917) (the limited habeas corpus
jurisdiction of the court is not invoked, but the broad equity jurisdiction over the custody
of the persons of infants which the chancellor exercises as parens patriac); Queen v.
Gyngall [1893] 2 Q. B. 232, 239; POmEROY, EQuITy JUaIsPRuDENcE (4th ed. 1918)
§ 1307. However, in a habeas corpus proceeding to realease a minor from a sberlf'
custody, the only proper subject of inquiry is whether the child was unlawfully restrained.
In such circumstances the court will not decide who will be awarded custody. Ex party
Reinhardt, 88 Mont. 282, 292 Pac. 582 (1930).
92. In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 85 Pac. 190 (1904); McDonald v. Short, 190 Ind. 338,
130 N E. 536 (1921); People ex rel. Curtis v. Kidney, 225 N. Y. 299, 122 N. E. 241
(1918); State v. Heugin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N. W. 1046 (1901).
93. See People ex rel. Riesner v. New York Nursery and Child's Hosp., 230 N. Y. 119,
124, 129 N. E. 341, 343 (1920).
94. Witt v. Burford, 84 Fla. 201, 93 So. 186 (1922); Mesmer v. Egland, 197 Ind. 700,
151 N. E. 826 (1926); Adair v. Clure, 218 Iowa 482, 255 N. W. 658 (1934); Haynie
v. Hudgins, 122 Miss. 838, 85 So. 99 (1920); Lz parte Lee, 220 N. Y. 532, 116 N. E. 352
(1917); Bx parte Smith, 118 Wash. 1, 202 Pac. 243 (1921).
95. The authorities differ as to whether anyone but the father and the mother can
properly be said to be a natural guardian. Lamar v. Micou, 114 U. S. 218 (1885) (if
next of kin the grandparents are the natural guardians); Holmes v. Derrig, 127 Iowa 625,
103 N. W. 973 (1905). Contra: ScnouLER, DoMESTic RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) (only
the father and the mother are the natural guardians); People v. Schoonmaker, 117 Mich.
190, 75 N. W. 439 (1898) (a step-father is not a natural guardian, relying on Schouler).
Perhaps the question has been settled by an authoritative statement of the American Law
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petition in equity or by a writ of labeas corpus, a third party seeks to remove
the child from its father or mother or from both, it would seem that the court
should hesitate and should not decree such a change in custody unless the
facts positively demand such a resultP0 By canon law,07 by common law,03
and by statute"0 the natural parents are entitled to the custody of their minor
children except when they are unsuitable persons to be entrusted with their
care, control and education, 100 or when some special circumstance appears to
render such custody inimical to the welfare of the infant. Only the most
unusual circumstances justify a court in refusing a parent custody of his
child in favor of a third party, no matter how unselfish the latter's motives
may be.' 0 ' It is one thing to determine sole custody inter parentes but to grant
custody of a child to a person other than a parent presents a different problem.
However circumstances may be such that it is not only desirable but imperative
that a child be committed to the care of a third party.10 2 Again it must be
recognized that there exists a type of person who, oblivious of the child's
welfare, will sue merely to gain some pecuniary advantage attached to the
infant's custody or to annoy and wound the feelings of the parent or guardian.
In such case the vital issue of the litigation, the welfare of the infant, is ob-
scured by the animosities of adults in their scramble for primacy of position
for themselves. Courts should hesitate to permit children to be made the
excuse or occasion for adult controversies, and should guard against the inevi-
table mental consequences upon the children resulting from battles among their
elders.' 0 3
The wishes and preferences of a child will be consulted if it has reached the
age of discretion, 0 4 but a child's mere whim will not be permitted to subvert
Institute to the effect that a grandmother is a natural guardian. RrsrAr-rTr, Co!._cr
or LAws (1934) § 39.
96. Ez parte Martin, 29 Idaho 716, 161 Pac. 573 (1916); Ex parte Hollinger, 9D Kan.
77, 132 Pac. 1181 (1913); State v. Armstrong, 141 Minn. 47, 169 N. W. 249 (1918);
Ex parte Clark, 82 Neb. 625, 118 N. W. 472 (1908) (to remove child a positive unfitness
of parent must be shown); Lynch v. Poe, 53 Okla. 595, 157 Pac. 907 (1916) (to obtain
custody grandparents must show father unfit); Ex parte Barnes, 54 Ore. 548, 104 Pac.
296 (1909) (father entitled to custody as against mother's parents); State ex rel. Collins
v. Bell, 58 Wash. 575, 109 Pac. 51 (1910).
97. "The right of parents and guardians under God is inalienable and inviolable
because the child belongs primarily and before others to the parents; this natural right
has its foundation in the very fact of procreation and involves the right of the parent
to feed, clothe and educate his children .... These rights involve their corresponding
duties which parents may neither evade nor ignore." 6 AUGUSTMr. CoDE or C&No:T LAw,
(3d ed. 1923) 412.
98. See notes 20 and 26, supra.
99. See notes 40 and 41, supra.
100. See notes 28 and 30, supra.
101. See Matter of Vanderbilt, 245 App. Div. 211, 213, 281 N. Y. Supp. 171, 173 (Ist
Dep't 1935).
102. Harrist v. Harrist, 151 Ala. 656, 43 So. 962 (1907) (mother subjected child to
drudgery); Nannestad v. Nannestad, 44 S. D. 241, 183 N. W. 541 (1921) (father in
delicate health) ; Hutchison v. Harrison, 130 Va. 302, 107 S. E. 742 (1921).
103. See In re Norris, 157 Misc. 333, 334, 283 N. Y. Supp. 513, 516 (Surr. CL 1935).
104. Garrett v. Mahaley, 199 Ala. 606, 75 So. 10 (1917) (expressed wish of child will
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the whole law of the family. 0 5 The fact that a child's affections are fixed on
those having its custody so that he regards his mother as a stranger does not
deprive her of the right of custody.10 Although such preferences are not con-
trolling when all other circumstances are equal, the child's wish may be the
determining factor. 0 7 In this type of proceeding, as in custodial orders inci-
dental to matrimonial actions, the welfare of the child overshadows all other
considerations. 0 8 It has been said that this rule is based on the theory that
a sound growing citizenry is essential to the perpetuation of the state.'0 D
Despite this unemotional criterion of award, the judiciary constantly senses
the importance of the family unit.1" 0 The sensibilities and rights of the parties
will not be disregarded when a proceeding for custody has been instituted by
a third party."' Thus lack of wealth is not sufficient reason for depriving
a father of custody in favor of wealthy grandparents. 112 Nor will mere material
advantage to the child overcome a parent's natural right."13
Conclusion
Vexatious and troublesome are the questions relating to custody and control
of children. Out of this morass of confusion, however, some certainty may
be accorded great weight); Ellis v. Jesup, 74 Ky. 403 (1875) (court will not take child
from third person and award it to father against wishes of child); People ex rel. Bishop
v. Bishop, 117 App. Div. 445, 102 N. Y. Supp. 592 (1st Dep't 1907) (wish of twenty
year old daughter to live with father fulfilled); Hutchison v. Harrison, 130 Va. 302, 107
S. E. 742 (1921).
105. Brown v. Harden, 159 Ga. 99, 102 S. E. 864 (1920) (child's wishes not controlling);
Edwards v. Edwards, 23 Ky. 1051, 64 S. W. 726 (1901) (preference of children not con-
trolling over parents, prima facie right to custody) ; Kinnaird v. Lowry, 102 Miss. 557, 59
So. 843 (1912) (child's desire to stay with grandmother does not defeat mother's right to
custody). Ex parte Swall, 36 Nev. 171, 134 Pac. 96 (1913) (on habeas corns proceeding
child's preference of third party does not defeat parent's rights) ; Ex parte Sidle, 31 N. D.
405, 154 N. W. 277 (1915).
106. Ex parte Matthews, 176 Cal. 156, 167 Pac. 873 (1917); Kinnaird v. Lowry, 102
Miss. 557, 59 So. 843 (1912).
107. Knochemus v. King, 193 Iowa 1282, 188 N. W. 957 (1922); Ellis v. Jesup, 74 Ky.
403 (1875); Workman v. Watts, 74 S. C. 546, 54 S. E. 775 (1906).
108. See notes 54 and 94, infra.
109. Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 465, 111 Pac. 21, 25 (1910); Merceln v. People,
25 Wend. 64, 103 (N. Y. 1840).
110. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S.
510 (1925). See Wilson v. Mitchell, 45 Colo. 454, 111 Pac. 21, 25 (1910).
111. Garrett v. Mahaley, 199 Ala. 606, 75 So. 10 (1917); Kinnaird v. Lowry, 102 Miss.
557, 59 So. 843 (1912); Ex parte Livingston, 151 App. Div. 1, 135 N. Y. Supp. 328 (2d
Dep't 1912).
112. Adair v. Clure, 218 Iowa 482, 255 N. W. 658 (1934).
113. Ex parte Judge, 91 N. J. Eq. 395, 116 Atl. 720 (1920); In re Mead, 113 Wash. 504,
194 Pac. 807 (1920).
In speaking of wealth as a criterion of award, one court said, "The philosophy of this
teaching, if carried to its logical consequence, would justify the state in taking away from
parents of little means a precocious and promising child, and giving it to others who, by
means of their greater wealth, could give it greater such material advantages. That
philosophy has never been accepted in this country, and I think it not likely to be."
Lester v. Lester, 178 App. Div. 205, 222, 165 N. Y. Supp. 187, 199 (2d Dep't 1917).
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be extracted. The first point of emphasis is to note dearly and decisively that,
in America at least, the inherent rights of control and custody of children are
firmly fixed in the home, and in the natural parents. In the absence of ab-
normal circumstances within the domestic circle the State has only a limited
right to intervene in matters pertaining to the child's moral, educational,
physical and religious upbringing. When complications intervene and the
breakdown of the home is involved, the approach by the State to this regret-
table situation is with the objective of protecting the best interests of the
child. The salvaging of human values is essentially a matter of compromise
with the eye of the court directed to the welfare of the unfortunate children.
No magic formula exists. Institutional care,114 and paternalism of the State
may be imperative in these emergencies but no law or statute can completely
rectify the irreparable harm and work a satisfactory solution. Perhaps the
parting proposal might be that the cure is not to be found in the law but in
a removal of the social and economic shortcomings which have made the
children the innocent victims of their elders' folly.
T=n CONTRACT OF THE CORPORATE SURETY.'-NOt until the last quarter
of the nineteenth century did corporate enterprise in this country grasp the
potentialities inherent in the practise of "going bond."2 One of the oldest of
114. There is a definite trend to place a dependent child in a foster home rather than
in an institution. This is because institutional life is necessarily surrounded with artificial
atmosphere which is inferior to the natural contacts which home life provides. Wmzn Housz
Cor x .aNc oN Cams HFATH AND PROTECMION. Sr.cO. IV (1930) 134; HALL, So z,
WoRK Yr~kR Boon (1935) 164; MANGOLD, PROBLMS OF Cmw Wsr~ Ar (1930) 499. "Insti-
tutional care for the most part has produced uninspired individuals poorly adjusted for the
outside world." W3rrn HousE CONFERENCE ON CmD HEALTH Alm Pnorwrio.'. Sacno:; IV
(1930) 134.
1. Bifold in meaning, the term "suretyship" is more generally employed in its broad
senso by the courts to include all promises to answer for the debt of another regardless
of the form of the undertaking. Bouvtm, LAw Dicnoxanx (Student's ed. 1928) 1152;
AAwr, SuRrsn, (1931) § 5. Because the law applicable to the term is usually the
same when the term is used either in respect to primary obligations, which are also known
as those of strict suretyship, or to those collateral or accessorial in nature, more often
called guaranties, courts have little reason to be hyper-techaical in the choice of these
words. Ibid. 2 WnroN, CoNmRACTS (1920) § 1211. Where, however, distinction is
thought necessary for clarity, courts do not hesitate to use the terms "guaranty" and
"suretyship" in their restricted sense. Pfaelzer v. Kau, 207 EL. 116, 69 N. E. 914 (1904);
Young v. Merle & Heaney Mfg. Co., 184 Ind. 403, 110 N. E. 669 (1915); Clymer v.
Terry, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 300, 109 S. W. 1129 (1908); Ricketson v. Lizotte, 90 VL 386,
98 At 801 (1916).
2. According to Morgan, The History and Economics of Suretyship (1927) 12 Coaer.
L. Q. 153, 487, the first company to be chartered in America was the Fidelity Insurance
Co. in 1865. 34 BANKERs' MAGAZINE 423, fixes the organization of the first corporate
surety in 1866, while according to Arnold, The Compensated Surety (1926) 26 Cot.. L. RzT.
171, the first incorporation of this type of business did not occur until 1875 although
attempts to organize were begun as early as 1853 in this country and 1720 in England.
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